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Abstract
In 2014, the State Council of the Chinese Communist Party announced the institution of a social credit
system by 2020, a follow-up to a similar statement on the creation of a social credit system issued by the
State Council in 2007. Social credit ratings of the type being developed by the State Council in partnership
with Chinese companies go beyond existing financial credit ratings in an attempt to project less-tangible
personal characteristics like trustworthiness, criminal tendencies, and group loyalty onto a single scale.
The emergence of personal credit ratings is enabled by Big Data, automated decision-making processes,
machine learning, and facial recognition technology. It is quite likely that various kinds of personal and
social credit ratings shall become reality in the near future. We explore China’s version of its social credit
system so far, compare the welfare and epistemological qualities of an ecology of personal ratings eman-
ating from polycentric sources versus a social credit rating, and discuss whether a social credit system in an
ideologically driven state is less a tool to maximize social welfare through trustworthiness provision and
more a method of preventing and punishing deviance from a set of party-held ideological values.
Keywords: Institutions: design; formation, and operations; Institutions and the macroeconomy
1. Introduction
Personal ratings systems (PRSs) are scoring systems that attempt to project salient characteristics of an
individual onto some scale or grade indicative of trustworthiness and other qualities. Financial credit
ratings, a form of PRS, are hegemonic in the USA and the EU. The sharing economy relies heavily on
mutually rating both sides of a transaction using some variation of a five-point star rating. Matching
apps for romantic and professional partnerships use proprietary algorithms utilizing salient user-
provided information considered representative of important relationship variables. Good ratings
drive traffic to products and services and open more opportunities to the highly rated consumer.
Bad ratings, if bad enough, may ban both providers and users from a given platform.
In 2014, as part of its Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the State Council of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) issued a document titled, ‘Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System’.
‘The social credit system is an important part of the socialist market economic system and social gov-
ernance system’, the document begins, tying the fate of Chinese socialism-with-capitalistic-elements to
the social credit system (shehui xinyong tixi – SCS). According to the State Council of the Chinese
Communist Party (2014), the requirements of an SCS are ‘establishing the idea of a sincerity (cheng-
xin) culture, and promoting honesty and traditional virtues, it uses encouragement for trustworthiness
(shouxin) and constraints against untrustworthiness (shixin) as incentive mechanisms, and its object-
ive is raising the sincerity consciousness and credit levels of the entire society’. The SCS is designed to
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go much further than foster trustworthiness in economic interactions. It is also intended to cover
moral and political actions.
The 2014 document follows up on a 2007 document called the ‘The General Office of the State
Council’s Opinions Concerning the Construction of a Social Credit System’ (State Council of the
Chinese Communist Party, 2007), where the State Council outlines the concept of a social credit sys-
tem whereby ‘the construction of a social credit system involves all aspects of economic and social life’.
Especially in combatting commercial and industrial fraud, the State Council claims that ‘[i]t is neces-
sary to play the role of chambers of commerce and associations, promote industry credit construction
and industry self-discipline’.
The idea of social credit as a dualistic financial and moralistic trustworthiness mechanism has a
deeper history in China: the dang’an system of personal files of grades, employment records, and crim-
inal records required for activities like promotion, applying for a baby permit, and receiving a retire-
ment pension and the hukou system of household registration (Creemers, 2018). However, we do not
believe the SCS in practice is an extension of the personnel dossier system to non-Party members, or
an extension of earlier traditions of controlling and shaping the morality of Chinese citizens. The SCS
is an unprecedented country-wide standardization of the normative values of Beijing based on new
technologies like algorithmic techniques on Big Data and automated decision-making processes.
Part of the motivation for the SCS is to encourage more Chinese to adopt credit, as only about 20%
of the Chinese population had a credit report in 2012 (Zhou, 2012). But it seems unlikely that financial
credit scoring would not have eventually existed in the absence of a CCP-designed credit score. Unlike
most other countries with established credit reporting, China was still largely a cash-based society in
the first decade of the 21st century. Chinese household debt to GDP in 2006 was very low, around
10%, though it was to rise steadily to about 30% in 2014 and to over 50% by the end of 2018. In
2006, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) created a ‘Credit Reference Center’ intended to be a
credit-scoring bureau utilizing information supplied by banks (Creemers, 2018). But few people
had bank accounts, so the bureau didn’t have enough information to develop reliable scoring.
Unexpectedly, the key to modernizing the cash-only Chinese society resided in the advent of smart-
phones. By 2013, millions of Chinese people had eschewed cash for the digital payment app AliPay,
whose transactional data provide a basis for credit scoring. Though executives at Ant Financial (an
affiliate of Alibaba) initiated the development of credit scoring using that data, the CCP launched
its own social credit score initiative the following year. Ant Financial’s Sesame (Zhima) Credit
remained one of the top contenders for the SCS until early 2018, when PBoC revoked the credit scor-
ing licenses of the eight commercial credit scoring companies and issued a 3-year license to Baihang
Credit, of which the eight companies are 8% shareholders and the National Interest Finance
Association of China (NIFA) is a 36% shareholder (PBoC, 2018; Reuters staff, 2018a; Xie 2018).
Whether China’s SCS is ultimately realized as a single numerical score or not, it is intended to
reflect the social desirability and undesirability of an individual, company, or regional government’s
behaviors as defined within the constraints of CCP ideology. High enough social credit scores earn
agents a place on a ‘redlist’, and low enough scores on a ‘blacklist’, a public database of ‘discredited
individuals’ (laolai) maintained by the Supreme People’s Court of China. Several provinces have
devised ways to publicly shame laolai, including placing their pictures and personal information on
giant screens in parks and squares and replacing ringtones with voice-overs proclaiming: ‘the person
you are calling is a dishonest debtor’ (Zeng, 2018). Moreover, in recent years, different levels of courts
(county, city, and provincial) have amplified the enforcement on dishonest debtors, which has been
facilitated by Skynet, the state-sponsored Big Data program (Xinhuanet, 2019). For example, the exe-
cution bureaus of courts not only have increased the frequency of forcible execution of orders of courts
on dishonest debtors, but also been able to track down dishonest debtors who fled, which was very
difficult to achieve previously without Big Data.
The SCS is just one manifestation of the use of Big Data to intentionally alter or control individual
behavior. Behavioral Big Data, what’s being called ‘surveillance capital’, has become big business in the
21st century (McCahill and Finn, 2014; Zuboff, 2015, 2019). For every individual every day, private
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companies and public entities collect huge volumes of personal data: GPS coordinates, satellite
imagery, online gaming behavior, how long employees use which apps on their work computers,
search results on Google and Baidu, products viewed on Amazon and Alibaba, customer loyalty
card usage, PayPal and AliPay transactions, ‘liked’ posts on Facebook and Twitter, comments made
on Reddit and news sites, steps taken and hours spent sitting or exercising, emails and SMS sent
and received.
The private mining and use of surveillance capital by large companies to alter behavior, dubbed
‘surveillance capitalism’, has been cause for recent alarm (Zuboff, 2019). Of particular alarm is the
monopolistic quality of some of the major companies, like Google and Facebook, who collect and ana-
lyze data using black-box proprietary algorithms to determine how best to modify user behavior to
generate returns for their commercial partners. Surveillance capitalism poses a threat to user choice
and liberty in the absence of the pressure of competition to soften the predatory edge of
decision-altering algorithms. In robust and agile markets, the use of surveillance capital will, like
other products, tend to benefit the user as much as the developer. In monopolized and inagile markets,
the use of surveillance capital becomes more worrisome from a human rights perspective, particularly
when the algorithmic use of data is arrogated by a single entity with the power to write law and con-
duct military operations. The corpus of one’s personal surveillance capital represents a relatively effort-
less digital footprint of what was once too difficult to trace or legally untraceable. Such a digital
footprint could be used to further the agenda of the data owner, particularly if the algorithms and
objectives of data use are obscured for reasons of intellectual property or national security.
Users seem to understand that algorithms on their data can be highly imperfect and have the
potential to be misused. Of particular concern are ratings systems developed out of surveillance capital.
In 2016, the personal ratings app Peeple went live and was almost universally panned by its users and
the media.1 Despite the attitude that rating people on a single scale is ‘horrible, cruel, and disgusting’
as one Peeple user wrote in his iTunes app store review (see footnote 2), privacy laws in the West have
not kept up with Big Data advances (Hartzog and Selinger, 2013). In 2016, the European Union
approved the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), granting a ‘right of explanation’ of all deci-
sions made algorithmically or using automated decision-making processes. However, some have noted
ambiguity in the regulation that obviates the feasibility of defining or protecting such a right (Wachter
et al., 2017). In 2017, China passed a cybersecurity law, updated in 2018, which allows China’s
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to conduct penetration tests and record data from any computer
system for the purpose of cybersecurity (MPS, 2018).
In this paper, we assume data democratization is inevitable, and will greatly reduce the transaction
costs of both collecting surveillance capital and developing personal ratings. We therefore focus not on
the cost of ratings systems or whether or not they’d emerge in a polycentric fashion, but on the epis-
temological content of personal ratings that arise in a polycentric fashion versus the epistemological
content of centrally designed personal ratings. We also consider the more expedient, adaptive uses
of ratings systems that arise from polycentric versus centralized sources of surveillance capital, particu-
larly as methods of tracking and controlling individual behavior.
The utility, coordinativity, and potential danger of personal ratings depend strongly on the mix of
political and economic institutions in which they and their surveillance capital are developed, much in
the same way that a decentralized price discovery process has different informational qualities than a
centralized price setting process (Hayek, 1945). We place our case-study, China, in a framework of
exploration versus exploitation, then consider how centralized versus polycentric ratings processes
effect the epistemological and coordinative qualities of ratings. The exploitation versus exploration
framework, as opposed to traditional equilibrium analysis, is essential for understanding the different
effects of public versus polycentric innovation, as exploration and exploitation in combination are
analogous to creative destruction (Gupta et al., 2006; March, 1991; Ostrom, 2005, 2010; Simon, 1996).
1As of 15 March 2018, the Peeple app has a 1.7/5 rating on the iTunes app store. The top 1-star review pans the app on
principle, calling the idea of rating people ‘horrible, cruel, and disgusting’ (user JackTripodi, posted on 4 December 2016).
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2. A study of centralized social ratings: China’s SCS
Chinese planning takes the form of a ‘champagne pyramid’. Officials identify some dominant
contradiction at the top of the pyramid that impedes social progress, then identify the subpro-
blems and sub-subproblems derivable from the dominant contradiction that must be resolved
so society can progress to its next stage of development2 (Creemers, 2017). Official resolution
of dominant contradictions requires institutional design, the political form of which is expert
rule (Koppl, 2018). The dominant contradiction in the SCS design document is a lack of trust
and trustworthiness in financial transactions, commercial exchanges, personal interactions, judi-
cial actions, and in government (State Council of the Chinese Communist Party, 2014).
Social credit ratings are a type of PRS geared toward social ends that do not necessarily reflect the
subjective ends of rated individuals. Social credit ratings define trustworthiness as a hegemonous con-
cept subject to design of experts, in contrast to fragmented personal ratings emergent from polycentric
sources subject to competition and network effects present in regular markets and thus reflective of a
subjective, context-dependent form of trustworthiness. It is noteworthy that the catch-all characteristic
of the SCS, in that it reflects economic, moral, and political actions, is not a bug of the CCP’s scoring
system, but a feature. It is this mix of economic, moral, and political characteristics in contrast to an
ecology of fragmented and specialized ratings that is the subject of our modeling Section 3. First, we
take a thorough look at how the SCS has been designed, rolled out, and received thus far.
Proposed measures of the SCS
There are three basic requirements for the workability of China’s SCS, according to the State Council
of the Chinese Communist Party (2014): (1) a credit system covering the entire country and its sup-
porting database, (2) a ‘trustworthiness incentive mechanism’, and (3) an ‘untrustworthiness discip-
linary mechanism’. The language validating the expedient necessity of an SCS argues that the SCS
is, essentially, coordinative of the plans of individuals and businesses in the Chinese market socialist
system. The document stipulates that efforts will be made to improve the government image of honesty
and transparency, through standards the government sets for itself. The disciplinary mechanism is
designed to be harsh, with one former party official stating that the social credit system is crafted
so that ‘discredited people become bankrupt’ (Liu, 2018).
Businesses are a special focus of the report. Chinese corporations rely largely on state-controlled
credit, as there is a missing market in rewarding good investments and punishing bad investments.
The banking sector is highly regulated, which has had the unintended emergence of a $9 trillion sha-
dow banking sector to enable firm-bank-firm loans, trust loans, and peer-to-peer loans, often to
higher-risk debtors who do not have access to legal credit (Weinland, 2019). The SCS is also intended
as a way to track compliance with safety and quality standards, blacklist companies that do not comply,
and use the blacklist to target market bans and force withdrawals of some businesses. Banks are
brought into the credit rating system as a way of reducing fraud. Tax evasion is a particular focus
by using the social credit system’s databases to better track property ownership and income. Tax vio-
lators go on a blacklist (Credit China, 2019). Pricing comes under even stricter control to ‘standardize
market price order’. The document urges the use of social credit scores as determinants of who con-
tracts with whom in any given business deal, effectively shutting people out of commercial life if their
credit scores are too low.
Despite the many stipulations about citizen behavior and blacklisting, there is no system in place for
preventing abuse by officials, ensuring data quality and score accuracy, allowing citizens to dispute
scores, or protecting citizen privacy. By the end of 2018, there were over 14 million individuals on
the blacklist, with over 4 million added in 2018 alone, and only 2.2 million taken off the blacklist
as a result of having engaged in some forms of mitigating behavior or reparations (Credit China,
2For example, see discussions of Dobson and Kashyap (2006) on the banking system reform and Coase and Wang (2012)
on the Great Leap Outward in the late 1970s.
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2019). As Chen and Cheung (2017) put it, ‘[i]ndividuals risk being reduced to transparent selves
before the state in this uneven battle’ (357).
Furthermore, it is unclear the Chinese suffer such a paucity of trust services to justify the creation of
a single-scaled centralized social credit system. The 21st century Chinese business practices demon-
strate elaborate trust-gaining practices, where social gatherings with new employees and clients are
essential to establishing professional trust (Chua, 2012). Though the Chinese had relatively low credit
usage as of 2014 (36.3% of people aged 15+ compared to 51.4% in the United States), they had high
levels of formal bank account ownership (79%) (Fungáčová and Weill, 2014). Furthermore, Chinese
credit usage as of 2014 was a good deal higher than China’s wealthy protectorate Hong Kong
(25.8%), and higher even than long-developed France (28.3%) (WorldBank Global Findex, 2014).
While China’s household debt to GDP was only 10% in 2006, it increased to 52.6% by the end of
2018, just below Germany (Trading Economics, 2019).
Furthermore, the apparent credit-shyness of Chinese citizens may not be due to a lack of general
trustworthiness but to the state’s heavy-handedness in banking, and the ways in which credit and col-
lection in China differs from credit and collection in developed democracies. Chinese banks are natio-
nalized; credit is issued from and controlled by the Chinese government. Credit is semi-collectivized at
the familial level, such that Chinese banks can force family-members, spouses, and even ex-spouses to
settle unpaid debts (Wang and Buckley, 2019). In some circumstances, like for a ‘malicious overdraft’,
the CCP considers unpaid debts to be criminal offenses. The debtor must then prove the overdraft was
non-malicious (Liu, 2011). Even if a Chinese citizen avoids a visit from the police after defaulting, they
may still get a visit from debt collectors. Chinese debt collectors employ harsher tactics than in devel-
oped democracies and have been known to kidnap people and hold them until their debts are repaid
(Feng, 2017).
Technical structure of the SCS
During the first period of the SCS rollout (2014–17), China gave eight companies the opportunity to
come up with a credit scoring system. The two biggest contenders were WeChat developer Tencent’s
partner, China Rapid Finance, and Ant Financial’s Sesame (Zhima) Credit. Zhima Credit was by far
the most popular, used by 58% of respondents in a study by Kostka (2018), followed by Tencent Credit
at 31%. Scores are linked to a Chinese citizen’s official ID (shenfenzheng). A different app for Chinese
youths, called China Youth Credit Management or CY Credit, is being developed by Tsinghua’s
Unigroup in partnership with the Communist Youth League Central Committee (CYLCC) and the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (Jing, 2019).
By the beginning of 2018, the PBoC approved Baihang Credit Scoring to collect information, store
data, and use that data to create credit scores for individuals and companies (Reuters staff, 2018b). The
eight companies who worked on developing their own version of social credit scoring are shareholders
of Baihang Credit. It is not yet clear whether or not Baihang Credit will rate citizens on Zhima Credit’s
scale, or if it will use a different scale. It is clear in the planning documentation (in particular the State
Council of the Chinese Communist Party, 2014, 2016) that officials intend for the SCS to be a single,
comprehensive score that encompasses economic, moral, and political actions. The final version of the
SCS may result in a sorting mechanism for redlists and blacklists, finer control in the form of
CCP-approved behavioral nudges, or both.
To get a sense of how the rollout has worked so far, credit scores administered through Zhima
Credit range between 350 and 950 points. Some credit scores, like very early versions of ‘mass credit’
(dazhong xinyong) tested in 2010 in Suining, Jiangsu province, begin at 1000 points and result in a
graded A–D classification (Creemers, 2018). Regardless of the ratings range, a feature of most of
the credit scores tested so far is that users earn or lose points based on things they do (Botsman,
2017a). In the case of Zhima Credit, its scoring takes into account five categories of action-types
that are weighted and subject to a proprietary algorithm: (1) financial credit history (35%), (2)
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purchase-related behavior (25%), (3) having a steady income and possessing assets (20%), (4) personal
information (15%), and (5) social behavior on the platform (5%) (Creemers, 2018).
Charity work, separating and recycling rubbish, donating blood, and sharing links from a state-
sponsored news agency praising the CCP are the kinds of deeds that earn citizens points on their credit
score (Osborne, 2018; Zeng 2018). Citizens with high social credit scores can be rewarded with free gym
facilities, high-speed broadband access, discounts on energy bills, cheaper public transport, foreign tra-
vel visas, shorter wait times in hospitals, better insurance premiums, better interest rates at banks,
no-deposit rentals, higher quality schooling for their children, access to better restaurants, public appro-
bation, and better dating pools on dating sites like Baihe (Ma, 2018; Margolis, 2017; Zeng, 2018).
Bad deeds that negatively impact one’s social credit score include a wide range of behavior, not all
forms of which are explicitly known. Most citizens find the social rating system opaque (Chen and
Cheung, 2017). Beyond the obvious – holding too much unpaid debt – behavior that hurts one’s credit
score includes: ‘…not showing up to a restaurant without having cancelled the reservation, cheating in
online games, leaving false product reviews, and jaywalking’ (Zeng, 2018); sharing a news article
about China’s recent stock market collapse (Osborne, 2018); not walking your dog enough, refusing
to carry out military service, spending too much time playing video games or posting on social
media, spreading ‘fake news’, and being a bad driver (Ma, 2018); eating, sleeping, or playing loud
music on the train, reading the wrong books, not paying utility bills on time, having the wrong
friends, saying negative things about one’s friends or economy or government, having friends or
family that say negative things about their friends or economy or government, and of course, men-
tioning Tiananmen Square (Botsman, 2017a).
If one’s score is low enough, or one’s behavior is deemed bad enough by the CCP, she is placed on a
publicly accessible blacklist. Citizens with bad scores are ‘discredited individuals’ (laolai). Sometimes,
all it takes is a single offensive action to find oneself blacklisted. Early documents establishing the prac-
tice and motivation for blacklisting describe it as using restrictions and public shaming to punish non-
compliance with court-ordered punishments and fines (Creemers, 2018: 14). According to the
Supreme People’s Court (2010), which establishes the major framework for the SCS blacklist, being
blacklisted can restrict you from: buying plane or train tickets, especially for traveling abroad; sending
your children to private schools; eating in certain restaurants and staying in certain hotels; purchasing
insurance; purchasing or renovating property; obtaining financial credit; obtaining social security and
other benefits; establishing a social organization; obtaining government contracts; becoming a Party
member; joining the military; managing a state-owned enterprise (SOE) or acquiring other manage-
ment or ‘responsible’ positions; taking jobs in the food sector, the drugs sector, or in construction;
using public parks, fishing areas, beaches or forests. Reportedly, the full range of punishments is
much larger and continually expanding. For instance, your dog may be taken away from you for
not walking it enough (Ma, 2018), and your internet can be throttled (Botsman, 2017a).
Dissent can earn a citizen a blacklisting, as happened in the case of the journalist Liu Hu who
vocally criticized the Chinese government. In 2017, Hu attempted to buy a plane ticket and discovered
he’d been deemed ‘not qualified’. He later discovered that he could not buy property, take out a loan,
or travel on the posher Chinese trains (Vanderklippe, 2018). As of September of 2019, there had been
over 15 million cases of blacklisted individual, while those blacklisted individuals had been barred
from over 31 million flights and 6 million high-speed train trips (Court Order Execution, 2019).
A ‘redlist’ of highly rated citizens also exists, though it is much less clear how to positively impact
one’s SCS and get on the redlist than it is how to negatively impact one’s score and get on the blacklist
(Engelmann et al., 2019).
The SCS rollout
The SCS has so far consisted of a fragmented set of initiatives, undertaken by different companies and
counties, and rolled out in different regions at different times, some before the issuance of the SCS
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foundational document (State Council of the Chinese Communist Party, 2014). Not all SCSs have been
digital; some towns developed manual pen-and-paper SCSs. Gradation differed, as did blacklisting and
redlisting, among the different rollout cities (Mistreanu, 2018). Citizen feedback was integrated into
some of the experiments. Officials revised their SCS in Suining County over intense pushback over
point deductions for making ‘unauthorized’ petitions to higher authorities (Hao, 2018). While it is
reported some prominent blacklisted individuals were not notified in advance of their status nor
given an option to appeal (Wang, 2017), General Office of the CCP et al. (2016) does include notifi-
cation and appeal in its blueprint for the blacklist.
It must be stressed that regardless of the low-tech experiments run in some counties, the SCS is
intended to utilize large volumes of data and automate decision-making processes in its administration
and operation (Hoffman, 2018; Creemers, 2018: 20–2). Facial recognition glasses, facial recognition at
ATMs, and facial recognition cameras on Chinese streets have already resulted in thousands of arrests,
including high-profile arrests of wanted criminals who had alluded capture for years. China’s Skynet
and Xue Liang programs are geared toward complete coverage of all public places by surveillance cam-
eras by 2020, including the development of a centralized database of footage available at the local and
national levels (Zhang, 2018). Even as public facial recognition is being tested in other places like
London (Dearden, 2018), it carries a bevy of concerns about privacy, false positives, and racial discrim-
ination. Recently, Microsoft pulled its largest database of almost 100,000 individuals over ethical con-
cerns (Murgia, 2019). It was the largest facial recognition set in the world, used by several large
companies including Alibaba, Sensetime, and Mengvi – the two latter companies have created
Chinese equipment used to track Uighur minorities in Xinjiang province. Arrests and the internment
of religious minorities like the Uighurs in China have raised concerns about human rights and lack of
oversight in a country where government officials both have license to exploit user data at will and
where facial recognition is coupled with automated decision-making processes that can immediately
and algorithmically impact social credit scores (Vincent, 2018a, 2018b).
Reception of the SCS by Chinese citizens
The SCS has been surprisingly popular. Over 80% of respondents in a study by Kostka (2018) either
somewhat or strongly approve of SCSs, 19% remain neutral, and perhaps most strikingly, only 1%
either strongly or somewhat disapprove of SCSs. The study author notes that the survey results may
be skewed positive by their authoritarian context (ibid.: 9), though he believes the SCS doubters are
likely part of the neutral 19% (ibid.: 11). Older people, wealthier people, more educated people,
and urbanites were more likely to approve of SCSs than other groups. People generally approved of
local government-run credit systems (64%) more than commercial credit systems (55%) (ibid.: 12–
15). SCSs are largely perceived, thus far, as useful tools that provide more access to credit, help citizens
avoid scams, improve environmental regulatory compliance, and standardize ratings system for, say,
the food safety of local restaurants (ibid.: 21–22). In total, 76% of respondents agree there is a problem
with mutual trustworthiness in China (ibid.: 22). Some citizens say they have seen the behavior of their
fellow citizens respond positively during the implementation of the social credit system in their area
(Ma, 2018). The survey and interview data indicate that trustworthiness mechanisms are useful tools;
respondents found both local and commercial ratings systems to be useful in various ways, with some-
what higher approval for the government-run solutions.
These results do not imply that a centrally designed and administered SCS is necessary or better
than the alternative in the long run. While the lack of interpersonal trust in China has been correlated
with marketization in some research (Zhang and Xin, 2019), it seems to contradict the observed high
and average levels of interpersonal trustworthiness in marketized places with Chinese language and
culture like Hong Kong and Taiwan, respectively (Ward et al., 2014). Additionally, both places
have western-style systems to determine financial trustworthiness for determining eligibility for
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loans and credit. In total, 61% people in Hong Kong have three or more credit cards in their wallet,
and 64% people use mobile wallets (JD Power, 2019).
3. The emergence of personal ratings from polycentric sources
As economists, we are especially interested in the subjective value of personal ratings, as proxied
by their epistemological quality. Personal ratings are intended to represent individual character-
istics and behaviors are correlated with trustworthiness in commercial, financial, and social inter-
actions. Trust and trustworthiness are central considerations to any system of personal ratings, as
noted in China’s SCS rollout documents (State Council of the Chinese Communist Party, 2014,
2016). Personal ratings are intended to be trust-enhancing; the more general and less specific
the ratings, the more broadly they are intended to be indicative of trustworthiness.
Trust is present in ‘[v]irtually every commercial transaction’ (Arrow, 1982) and can radically
change the outcome of any transaction (Ostrom, 2010). Trust modeling in the neoclassical frame-
work has often taken the form of suggesting ways to ameliorate incomplete, asymmetric informa-
tion, or costly information (Akerlof, 1970). Often, anticipatory regulation is suggested to rectify
problems of information (see discussion in Klein, 1997: 3). Anticipatory regulation isn’t strictly
necessary, as evidenced by the increasing number of organizations (including the Canadian govern-
ment and Dell) who have begun to adopt guiding principles to help reduce deadweight losses in the
event that some abnormally bad outcome during the execution of a contract between two parties
(Frydlinger and Hart, 2019).
Communication is an informal institution. Communication between individuals to reduce uncer-
tainty and improve information symmetry is central to the development of trust. Developing a
forum for communication requires common rules and norms of the space, typically encapsulated by
membership, regional, or ritualistic restrictions. See, for example: the creation of gossip networks
(Merry, 1984), chatting (Tullock, 2005), going out for cocktails with potential business partners to
build guanxi (Botsman, 2017b), congregating in particular establishments with membership restrictions
as in the London cafes that hatched modern stock trading (Stringham, 2015), and the creation of track-
ing mechanisms like those used by Japan’s financial clearinghouses (Ryser, 1997). Such networks can
utilize information more efficiently than established leadership hierarchies (Banerjee et al., 2014).
Shearmur and Klein (1997) argue that when societies become more anonymous, we need some
other way of signaling trustworthiness, what they call ‘seals of approval’ (Klein, 1997: 4). Thus, society
is a ‘a flowing patchwork of reputational communities’ (ibid.: 5) where people seek out and aspire to
obtain seals of approval. Businessmen in the early 20th century rural North Carolina, for instance,
carried proof of membership in the Baptist church as evidence of their trustworthiness (Weber,
2002(1948)). One of the primary signals of entry-level employability in modern developed democra-
cies is some form of university degree or certificate (Caplan, 2018). Systems to produce seals of
approval are typically rooted in social norms and small-town practices, and though these services
tend to expand in size and scope and become standardized, they also become more expensive the lar-
ger the society and more anonymous the transaction (Shearmur and Klein, 1997: 6–7, 37).
The quality of any seal of approval depends on (1) how well the seal of approval correlates with
characteristics relevant to the success of any trust-requiring transaction, and (2) the network of peo-
ple who co-produce and utilize the seal of approval. Businessmen in rural North Carolina relied on
the reputation of the Baptist church for its trustworthy membership and on a large network of peo-
ple who were both members of the Church and who interact with members of the Church. More
recently, distributed and decentralized online interactions, which exhibit the informational asym-
metry of anonymity, have given rise to many new kinds of seals of approval like product and pro-
vider star-ratings, seller feedback, and mutual provider/user ratings in the sharing economy.
Distributed and decentralized ledger technology, exemplified by the blockchain and related applica-
tions like smart contracts, is greatly reducing the cost of enforcing contracts in large and anonymous
markets (Norgaard et al., 2018).
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Large volumes of continuously updating data coupled with rapidly improving technologies for
harnessing and making sense of that data will undoubtedly continue to provide new means and
lower costs for both the centralized and decentralized generation of seals of approval. Before
they were explicitly tasked and licensed to do so, Ant Financial planned to develop a credit scoring
system when the cost of obtaining detailed personal and transactional information drastically
reduced thanks to the ubiquity of smartphones and AliPay. As such, for our analytical purposes,
we are specifically interested in the comparative advantages and disadvantages of a developed ecol-
ogy of personal ratings emanating from polycentric sources versus a developed centralized system
of hegemonous personal ratings.
The emergence and construction of personal ratings
Especially as it is rooted in information asymmetries and free rider problems, trustworthiness has been
frequently categorized as a public good (Anomaly, 2017). In traditional economic analysis, trust-
worthiness is a solution to a commitment problem whereby the gains of deception in the short run
are balanced against the gains of long-term cooperation. This calculus dictates the extent to which pri-
vately provided trust is effective. Since it never pays to be honest in a society characterized by a paucity
of trustworthiness, such a state of affairs is self-reinforcing, and thereby (according to a static equilib-
rium analysis) virtually impossible to alter without public intervention.
Personal ratings represent another way to mitigate the cost of trustworthiness in large and anonym-
ous societies. Personal ratings are seals of approval indicative of personal characteristics relevant to an
interpersonal transaction. When hiring a rideshare driver, riders might care about drivers who dem-
onstrate good driving skills, hygiene, and perhaps, conversation. Similarly, drivers might prefer riders
to be quiet, sober, and clean. Whether or not either driver or rider is attractive might not matter to the
quality of the ride for some; for others, it might. Specialized personal ratings of this sort are ubiqui-
tous, though typically localized to a certain platform of interaction. Specialized ratings are specialized
in that they refer to a small set of characteristics deemed relevant to signaling trustworthiness or qual-
ity in a particular interaction, rather than the entire corpus of an individual’s characteristics or beha-
viors as in social credit ratings.
PRSs may also consist of how many followers or ‘likes’ someone has and how often their content
has been shared by others (common on platforms like Twitter and Instagram), the difference between
how often their comments have been upvoted or downvoted (common on platforms like Reddit), and
whether their reviews have been rated ‘helpful’ by other users (common on platforms like Yelp and
Amazon). Giant databases like Experion specialize in acquiring information about people along as
many axes possible, and are often used by legal entities, employers, and the government to score a
person’s credit or criminal history.3
There are three delivery methods for PRSs: crowd-sourced, where anonymous strangers determine
the rating; algorithmic, where the app developers create a black-box algorithm that determines the rat-
ing; and mutual, where two (or three) people known to each other rate each other from their inter-
action. There are three types of PRSs: single-scale, single-aspect, and multi-aspect. Single-scale
ratings attempt to reduce the salient bits of an individual to a single number (Peeple4, Zhima
Credit). These apps have raised the most ethical concerns among users (see Reagle (2015) on
Peeple and similar apps, and Margolis (2017) on Zhima Credit). These apps can be crowd-sourced
(Peeple) and algorithmic (Zhima Credit), though the television show Black Mirror foreshadowed
how single-scale ratings could conceivably be mutual. Single-aspect ratings attempt to rate
particular aspects of a person like their professional capabilities (RateMyProfessors5, Uber, AirBnB)
3Note especially that we do not include scorable characteristics like IQ, EQ, MBTI, or automated decision-making algo-
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attractiveness (Spontana6), intelligence (Best IQ Test7), and MBTI-type personality
(PersonalityMatch8). These apps can be crowd-sourced (Spontana), algorithmic (Best IQ Test), and
mutual (Uber). Multi-aspect ratings allow people to rate each other (and themselves) on many
axes, most notably a feature of dating apps (OkCupid, Tindr, eHarmony) and employee/employer-
rating apps (Dots9, Pluggd, TaskRabbit). These apps can be crowd-sourced (Dots), algorithmic
(OkCupid), and mutual (Pluggd, TaskRabbit).
We summarize and provide examples of PRSs in Table 1 (including scorable characteristics). Unless
marked with a single asterisk (*), all personal ratings are commercially offered.
For PRSs to be coordinative of the ends of users, they should advance a user’s subjective ends. If we
consider traditional credit scores, a credit score is useful insomuch as it signals a debtor’s creditworthi-
ness. In the language of risk assessment creation, a risk assessment is useful in that it assigns likeli-
hoods of individuals engaging in some kind of behavior that matches the distribution of future
observed behavior. Lenders don’t care so much if a potential client is a good driver, or whether she
shared an article critical of her country on Twitter. Multi-aspect ratings of this sort provide a better
signal if their composition is based on a narrow set of characteristics highly correlated with the desired
signal. The algorithmic method of relating characteristics to signal is also important. Certainly, ratings
should weight characteristics most relevant to the signal the most. Characteristics might themselves be
ratings, or simple states that represent historical behavior.
Suppose a particular PRS is based on k characteristics C1, …, Ck. Characteristics should be rated on
or converted to the same numerical scale [σ1, σ2], σ1 <σ2. Define a mapping s:C
k ×N→ γ∈ [σ1, σ2],
where N = [1, …, i, …, n] and such that there are n agents in the system. Then, if Cji is the particular
value of that characteristic for agent or household i, s(Cji) is the score of that value on the range [σ1,
σ2]. We can then define weights a
j
i for each characteristic C
j




i = 1. A good PRS is
one where characteristics are weighted according to their relevance to a particular transaction.
A simple model of a generalized PRS might look something like:
PRS(C1, . . . ,Ck, i) = a1i s(C1i ) + a2i s(C2i ) + · · · + aki s(Cki ) (1)
By specifying characteristics as ‘bins’ corresponding to traits considering positively correlated to the
desirable behavior or feature represented by the credit score, the coefficients as scores for each bin, and
the function PRS as a mapping from individual i with a vector of coefficients αi to a score proxying a
single aspect (like trustworthiness), our formulation corresponds with generalized models of risk
assessment (Kleinberg et al., 2016).
A particular instance of a personal rating as defined in (1) then adjusts the weights according to the
relevance to the desired signal and the demographics of the individual or agent type i. A SCS is a spe-
cial case of a generalized PRS where the weights are not demographically adjusted, i.e. are the same for
everyone in all transactional contexts. We can write an SCS like so:
SCS(C1, . . . ,Ck, i) = a1s(C1i ) + a2s(C2i ) + · · · + aks(Cki ) (2)
A good indicator is a metric that correlates well with whatever hidden information it presumes to
proxy. Perhaps creditworthiness has something to do with the length someone has been at their cur-
rent job, for instance, but it’s likely less important than whether or not and for how long they’ve paid
their bills on time.
Algorithms for data collection and inclusion are also highly important to the quality of personal
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in a crowd actually do so with reasonable accuracy? Does a matching algorithm intended to match
romantic partners actually increase the number of successful relationships compared to brute-force
search? Like for tangible products, algorithms compete with each other to do a better job satisfying
some user’s subjective ends, and can suffer a loss of quality absent a robust competitive environ-
ment. Since actual market transactions generate crowd-sourced and mutual ratings, they should
be more accurate (Page, 2007) and less prone to expert and epistemological bias (Koppl, 2018).
However, there can be economies of scale in personal ratings, especially considering that ratings
are network goods.
The construction of ratings may favor more centralized or public aggregation methods if the
requisite technological infrastructure to aggregate, filter, track, and publish ratings isn’t advanced
enough to make small-scale ratings feasible, as summarized in Table 2. We assume in this paper,
however, that technology has penetrated a system enough to allow personal ratings to emerge from
polycentric sources.
Can algorithmic, single-scale ratings systems proxy trustworthiness?
In this section, we consider the epistemological difference between two systems: an ecology of personal
ratings emanating from polycentric sources, and a centralized PRS. We keep our analysis brief and
mostly illustrative, as a full model that includes the emergence and co-production of personal ratings
as a network good is out of the scope of this particular paper. To frame the analysis, we rely heavily on
the model of creditworthiness developed by Glover and Corbae (2015).
Glover and Corbae set up the problem of issuing debt to households with hidden characteris-
tics as highly correlated with their ability to pay-off the debt in the future. Credit scores are
calculated by looking at a household’s observable default history, dt = (d0, …, dt−1), and develop-
ing a probability πi,t(bt, d
t) at time t that a household i pays bt in some future period. The credit
score proxies that probability; the better the proxy (signal), the more profitable the lender.
Suppose Qt is the initial payout at time t to household i by the lender. Then we can write the
lender’s profit function Πi,t as
Pi,t(Qt, bt, dt) = −Qt + pi,t(bt, dt)bt (3)
A lender will engage a debtor i iff Πi,t >0. If πi,t is a good proxy for hidden characteristics that
correlate well with i’s ability to pay bt in the future, then utilizing πi,t tends to maximize the profit
of lenders and offer credit to all borrowers who are indeed able to pay back their loans, thereby maxi-
mizing their utility from taking debt.
A social credit rating can have two functions: (a) as a proxy for trustworthiness that is generally
coordinative of interactions requiring trust or assurance, or (b) as a method for producing behavioral





Facebook; Dots; Reddit Peeple






Mutual Uber; Lyft Pluggd; TaskRabbit; AirBnB Black Mirror’s
Nosedive
aScorable characteristics, but not social ratings.
bThese have elements of public scoring, depending on the system under consideration.
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compliance in citizens regardless if it is in their best subjective interest. The first function is that of a
benevolent designer, who seeks to increase social welfare in a Pareto or Kaldor–Hicks sense. We shall
consider whether a SCS is a better tool than an ecology of PRSs in the subjective welfare sense, to start,
then consider whether the SCS in China, in its current and probable future form(s), is a tool of welfare
enhancement or a tool of social control.
Let’s use (3) as a way of investigating how well the SCS can proxy for an indicator like Πi,t. For the
SCS to be a good proxy, we want to see how well it correlates with πi,t:
pi,t(bt,C1i , . . . ,Cki ) = gi,t + bi,tSCS(C1i , . . . ,Cki ) + ei,t (4)
where γi,t is some constant at time t, βi,t is correlation coefficient, and ϵi,t is an error term. Plugging (2)
into (4), we can rewrite the above as:
pi,t(bt,C1i , . . . ,Cki ) = bi,ta1s(C1i ) + bi,ta2s(C2i ) + · · · + bi,taks(Cki ) + ei,t (5)
Suppose now we consider the cluster of correlations between the characteristics and the probability
that household i provides the producer a benefit bt in the future. We only include significant charac-
teristics, non-negative correlations, and non-negative scores:
pi,t(bt,C1i , . . . ,Cki ) = Gi,t + x1i,ts(C1i ) + · · · + xki,ts(Cki ) + mi,t
To the extent that the SCS is a good indicator of the probability that household i will provide bene-
fit bt in the future, we’d expect xri,t to be close to βi,tα
r, and αr = 0 for insignificant characteristics.
Clearly, the SCS cannot include characteristics for which (1) there is no significant correlation to
Πi,t, and especially for which (2) there is a negative correlation to πi,t.
Create a distance measure d(xri,t,bi,tar) between the coefficients xri,t and βi,tαr, perhaps the mean
squared distance. When δ is small, the SCS may be a good proxy for πi,t. But δ will fail to be a good
proxy for Πi,t when the measured characteristics of people are not good proxies for their ability or
willingness to provide benefit bt in the future. The failure is twofold, producing false negative for
some groups of people and a false positive for other groups of people. We believe our results, though
not as rigorously proved, align well with similar results regarding the tradeoffs between predictability
and fairness as demonstrated for risk assessments like algorithms to help determine criminal recidiv-
ism (Kleinberg et al., 2016).
In an ecology of personal ratings emanating from polycentric sources, other ways of measuring
trustworthiness could emerge to handle groups that do not fit into some ‘standard pattern’ of trust-
worthiness. The SCS would then tend to reduce overall welfare as it would provide a false signal
that would expose the producer to more risk than profitable and/or bar households from engaging
in utility-increasing interactions based on inaccurate perceptions of their untrustworthiness in that
particular domain of interaction. Go back to the example of taking credit: a bad indicator of credit-
worthiness results in lost producer and consumer surplus in the credit market. Furthermore, a SCS
subverts the Kleinian format of trust services beginning in community practice and therefore tends
to reflect the values of the designers and not the community those services were designed to assist.
Table 2. The tradeoffs between the accuracy and cost of delivering personal ratings given a high volume of market
transactions, by type of delivery method
Delivery method Accuracy (high volume) Cost (high volume)
Crowd-sourced/mutual High High
Algorithmic Low Low
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What recourse do groups of people (including producers) have when a SCS fails? In an ecology of
personal ratings, they can simply opt to use another system, though the question of switching costs
and the compatibility between ratings systems must be addressed. Since our thesis is about comparing
a mature ecology of personal ratings with a social credit system, it stands to reason that as long as the
transaction costs of switching between ratings systems are lower than the opportunity costs of using a
subpar ratings system, an ecology of personal ratings should outperform a social credit system in terms
of social welfare.
4. The epistemological considerations of exploration
How does a polycentric ecology of PRSs do versus a SCS when dynamically utilizing knowledge
to produce trust services – that is, does a SCS outperform or underperform a polycentric ecology
of PRSs?
Social systems are characterized by creative evolution, the co-production of unpredictable and
unprestatable system-level outcomes which then feedback into the system, changing individual beha-
viors as unpredictably and unprestatedly (Beckage et al., 2013). Exploitation is exemplified by neoclas-
sical search intended to dissipate the advantages of a current institutional framework. Exploitation
works by, say, finding more complete contractual arrangements to reduce the uncertainty surrounding
the expected behaviors in any given interaction or exchange (Barzel, 1997; Cheung, 1983). Exploration
involves evolving the system into entirely new spaces of economic opportunities and available actions
by means of an endogenous novelty-generation mechanism. Exploration works via, say, a small set of
entrepreneurs expanding the set of potentially trust-enhancing solutions and thereby disrupting stable
product spaces (Kirzner, 1997; Koppl et al., 2015).
Exploitation tends to be more tractable to analysis than exploration because it closes the system
under consideration. As such, a great deal of ink has been spilled by economists using an exploitative
framework of analysis. Under stable conditions where change is constrained to a recognizable pattern
of variance, the exploitative framework can take an analyst far. These are not the characteristics of a
creatively evolving socioeconomic system, certainly not one the size of China’s.
Suppose for the sake of argument that a SCS is welfare-enhancing compared to an existing alter-
native. That does not imply the SCS is welfare-enhancing in the long run versus a long-run alternative.
SCSs are brittle to knowledge problems, as demonstrated in the previous section. Even if an SCS is
designed to be statistically useful in the absence of some other ratings system, people change, societies
change, technology further develops. The algorithmic structure, normative teleologies, and the data on
which SCSs depend are past-oriented. Making SCSs predictive, such that scores indicate the probabil-
ity someone will be trustworthy in the future, does not solve this problem. Predictive algorithms are
also past-oriented due to the nature of the data on which they learn. These problems do not differ in
substance from those explicated by Hayek (1945) with respect to utilizing knowledge under planning.
Polycentric systems under market orders allow for public, private, and public–private solutions to
problems of trustworthiness provision; more importantly, polycentric systems are context-aware and
dynamically adaptive. Examples of successful polycentric provision of public goods include polycentric
policing services (Ostrom, 2010, Stringham, 2015), lighthouses and lightships (Candela and Geloso,
2018; Foldvary and Klein, 2003), common-pool resource provision (Ostrom, 2010), and even stock
market regulation (Stringham, 2015). The experimentation phase of the SCS in China was itself, to
some degree, polycentric; China revoking the credit-scoring licenses of its eight commercial conten-
ders collapses that polycentricity to a single, centralized source, as if the epistemological efficiency
of polycentric systems is only important in the first draft of an idea and not in its dynamic realization
and re-realization. It is but one indication that the SCS is intended as a tool of social and political
stability as much as it is intended to be a trustworthiness mechanism.
Polycentric systems under exploration tend to have their hegemonous orders, equilibria, and
institutions disrupted by the discovery of novel solutions to social problems. Disruption isn’t a
bug of polycentric systems, it’s a feature. In order for knowledge to advantage everyone in the
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system, processes must be allowed to unfold in unknowable and potentially disruptive ways. Under
exploration, entrepreneurs continuously disrupt systemic ratings hegemonies with potentially more
coordinative methods of providing assurance. Mutual ratings in the sharing economy and star rat-
ings for traditional products and services alert users to untrustworthy producers, unsafe business
practices, and other salient characteristics, albeit imperfectly. Deep Web entrepreneurs of dark
e-commerce sites are solving the problem of extreme social extendedness and anonymity by
employing blockchain-ledger smart contracts that vet and punish defectors on either side of a
sales contract, essentially symmetrizing risk under the conditions of extreme information asym-
metry (Norgaard et al., 2018).
Polycentric orders under exploration are characterized by complex and nonlinear systemic behavior
such that outcomes cannot be predicted via the aggregation of individual actors engaged in standard
Bayesian reasoning (Arthur, 2013; Epstein, 2006; Miller and Page, 2009). Normative and centralized
social credit ratings represented by equation (2) have no endogenous learning mechanism to improve
the ratings system, unlike the natural winnowing and incentives to innovate present in a marketized
polycentric order. The SCS is designed to reflect the normative values of the CCP, whose expert-
constructed realization may fail to realize either the CCP’s ends or the end of maximizing subjective
welfare, especially when values change.
Thus, expert design of and rule over PRSs can fail along a variety of axes (Koppl, 2018). Experts
must pick sides. Groups whose subjective values are closest to the normative values promoted by
the experts will be winners in expert-constructed systems. Those whose subjective values deviate
from the normative values of experts lose. In China, dissidents certainly lose – the 2019 Hong
Kong protests against legalizing extradition of alleged criminals from Hong Kong to the Chinese
mainland succeeded in part due to the ability of protesters to subvert facial recognition and data col-
lection of their activities (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2019; Cuthbertson, 2019); religious people from the rela-
tively large Uighur Muslim and tiny Kaifeng Jewish communities lose (Mozur, 2019). Not only are
these groups not compensated under some Kaldor–Hicks scheme to maximize social welfare, they
are punished, often harshly. Unlike polycentric PRSs, SCSs do not ask each person what she believes
is best for her, they impose a worldview of what is best for that person onto her.
Furthermore, China’s movement toward algorithmic processes involving feedback loops and auto-
mated decision-making is troubling from both a scientific and human rights perspective (Brehm and
Loubere, 2018). Karen Yeung (2017) discusses many of the problems in automated decision-making
and -guiding of what she calls hypernudge, a Big Data-enabled, algorithmic form of nudging behaviors.
Devins et al. (2017) look at the algorithmization of decision-making and -guiding processes from the
perspective of law and regulation. From the perspective of subjective welfare maximization, the ‘Big
Data paradigm’ as they call it perpetuates “the belief that theory is no longer necessary because applied
mathematical and statistical techniques – based on algorithms – can ‘analyze’ data and find optimal
solutions better than human programmers” (ibid.: 7). The authors note especially that theoryless cor-
relations of the sort generated by machine learning on Big Data tend to overweight averages, recur-
sively augment bias, and definitionally ignore creative evolution.
Calude and Longo (2017) warn against a veritable ‘deluge of spurious correlations’ in Big Data sets,
such that machine learning on these sets may be intractably opaque to objective inference (assuming a
benevolent social planner). The other side of the spurious correlations coin is missing data: character-
istics that are more salient to the trustworthiness in certain interactions may be ignored because they
are costlier to determine than less salient characteristics. Consider the false inference that if a person is
good at A, she must be good at B or C or D: if A is ‘attractiveness’, this reduces to the infamous halo
effect (Rosenzweig, 2007). Unfortunately, the problems above aren’t very tractable: adding more data
come with more spurious correlations, selectively adding data come with bias. Finally, Devereaux
(2019) discusses how centrally administered cybernetic hypernudge suffers from the same epistemo-
logical problems as top-down central planning, a grave concern for the future of an algorithmized,
automatic SCS-behavior feedback loop.
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Varian (2014) reminds readers that estimating complex models comes at a high computational cost,
requiring variable selection over the set of potential predictors by the modeler. Thus, there is no the-
oryless data in data modeling, and where there’s theory, there’s room for the projection of bias onto
the system, particularly in systems that are ideologically driven.
5. Conclusion
We have demonstrated that social credit systems, a subset of PRSs, are plausibly welfare-inferior to
private ratings that are allowed to emerge from polycentric sources and form an ecology in which rat-
ings complement each other, compete, and adapt to the ever-changing values of users. Fragmenting
personal ratings along axes relevant to users and closer to user knowledge improves the epistemo-
logical content of that information. Algorithmic delivery has the potential to further drain ratings
of salience and representativeness, and is subject to bias and spurious correlations.
Polycentric ecologies of personal ratings will not be universally subjectively useful; nothing is.
Nor will all possible useful personal ratings emerge within a single institutional ecology. ‘Smart’
technologies, like data-driven technologies that use algorithms to improve user experiences and out-
comes, are emerging in a piecemeal fashion. Furthermore, the emergence of blockchain technologies
may be quite disruptive to many current social and political hegemonies (Cowen, 2018) and may
require different institutional ecologies to be most effective (MacDonald, 2019).
However, SCSs are plausibly superior at attaining the normative goals of a ruling political party.
China’s SCS is not designed to maximize the subjective value of its users, but to align Chinese citizens
with the ideology of the CCP and to punish deviants and other destabilizing elements. In this, it might
be effective. China’s is an authoritarian system. In a different socioeconomic system with a mix of pub-
lic and private services, citizens can ostensibly appeal to a public entity when they have been abused by
a private entity. In addition, the institution of the market grants users some measure of competitive
and financial power to reallocate to themselves welfare lost to participating in unfair ratings systems.
In China, deviations and non-conformity merit punishment in the form of blacklisting, which is
designed to be severe in comparison to infractions (State Council of the Chinese Communist Party,
2016). Despite a promised process of notification and appeal, the SCS is not opt-out; citizens have
no real recourse if they believe the SCS or its system of appeals is abusive or ineffective.
SCSs are, therefore, a useful tool to keep the powerful in power, by identifying and punishing those
whose behavior threatens the hegemony of the powerful. China has recovered in many ways from the
catastrophe of Maoist economics and the Cultural Revolution. Measures like the SCS threaten to take
China back to a time where China was more focused on the ideology of communism than advancing
the well-being of its people. The SCS weaponizes Big Data against its citizenry. The CCP’s stated rea-
sons for the creation of the SCS sound good on paper, but upon reflection dangle the freedom and
wealth of market participation in front of Chinese citizens like a carrot, transforming a force that
has greatly improved the lives and trajectories of entire communities into a lever of control.
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